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Abstract
This article argues that China’s Eastern Africa policy is based on Chinese national 
economic and strategic interests – but with significant contributions to regional 
order. Beijing couples its One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative and existing United 
Nations (UN) policies to ensure that economic development projects are linked to 
Chinese contributions to regional peace and stability. China contributes to regional 
order by emphasising the use of military force for defensive purposes only and by 
gaining pre-approval from the region for such interventions. It also provides strong 
government-backed economic and diplomatic assistance to African countries, to 
further foster such regional order. Yet, contrary to its stated intentions, Beijing’s 
focus on development and non-interference could pose challenges to human rights 
observance and issues of social justice – by potentially allowing rogue regimes to 
jeopardise the basic security of individuals. In turn, this could further challenge 
regional order by spreading instability and conflict across borders. 
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Introduction
China’s Eastern Africa2 policy is not merely aimed at protecting Chinese 
economic and security interests. Beijing also focuses on providing development 
and stability that benefit local communities. This article addresses the question 
how China reconciles the dilemmas arising from potentially conflicting demands 
from China’s foreign policy doctrines and the overseas context in which Chinese 
policies are implemented. For example, Beijing’s support for an African security 
architecture to promote security and stability as a basis for development creates 
dilemmas for China. Regional forums, such as the African Union (AU), demand 
more robust and offensive United Nation (UN) operations. Such demands clash with 
China’s preference for a defensive security posture based on strict adherence to non-
interference.3 The policy of non-interference has allowed China to establish a global 
economic engagement irrespective of political, social or economic differences with 
recipient countries. Beijing’s answer to these dilemmas is to become increasingly 
engaged in designing and providing for regional order and economic development. 
Regional order consists of basic rules of conduct that benefit the common interest 
of states in peace and security. China is a pioneer with its concept of regional order 
in East Africa, which couples its UN policy with its One Belt One Road (OBOR) 
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initiative. China’s UN policy emphasises diplomacy and defensive military force as 
tools for preventing atrocities against civilians and for promoting peace. The OBOR 
initiative provides regional economic infrastructure and communication links to 
enhance growth and welfare. In China’s view, this constitutes a coherent framework 
for the provision of the characteristics, which China sees as necessary elements in 
regional order: economic development, peace and stability for China as well as for 
the countries in which China is engaged. 
I use the theoretical approach of the English School to examine whether China 
builds strategic partnerships in East Africa that not merely benefit Chinese national 
interests, but also facilitate regional peace and security. The English School addresses 
the nexus between dynamics of power politics engendering competition for relative 
power and community dynamics that, in turn, may create political frameworks to 
facilitate peace and security. I address China’s Eastern Africa policy and its interplay 
with the UN by discussing China’s contributions to regional order through initiatives 
in peacekeeping, economic development and diplomacy based on a state-centred 
approach to enhancing development and security. I focus on the extent to which these 
policies serve not merely China’s national interest, but also the common interest in 
development and security. In conclusion, I assess the strengths and weaknesses in 
China’s attempt to contribute to regional order in East Africa. 
An English School perspective on order in international politics
The English School argues that, despite the prevalence of international anarchy, 
states behave as a community by regulating their interaction to promote peace 
and security.4 States regulate their interaction by agreeing on common rules of 
conduct. These constraints on state actions imply that states accept responsibility for 
protecting international peace and security, even if at times, this obligation requires 
that they forgo short-term national interests.5 
According to the English School, security dilemmas can be overcome because 
states realise that agreement on basic rules of conduct benefits their common interest 
in peace and security and helps them survive. A state’s goodwill vis-à-vis other 
states and its status as a worthy partner, form the basis for successful interaction 
with others. Consequently, reputation is an asset that states cannot afford to take 
lightly.6 International order requires rules that regulate the use of force of jurisdiction 
between political authorities and of the sanctity of agreements.7 Limitations on the 
use of force ensure that peace remains the normal condition in the international 
system. Constraints on the use of force do not necessarily prevent war. However, 
constraints may avert and control crises and prevent wars between lesser powers 
that, ultimately, may involve great powers. Constraints may therefore entail efforts 
such as conflict prevention and peacekeeping. 
Definitions of jurisdiction ensure clarity about the entities that have legitimate 
political authority and are responsible for maintaining international order. Legitimacy 
concerns the assessment by the international community of the entities entitled to 
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claim sovereign rights over a territory and its population.8 Economic transnational 
dynamics influence assessments of regime legitimacy. This happens because states 
are responsible for the protection of the basic rights of individuals to livelihood and 
to exercise political influence and not just for the preservation of the state system. 
Economic responsibilities transcend borders because economic and financial 
crises spread across the world swiftly, engendering a need for economic justice in 
the relationship between developed and developing countries.9 The emergence of 
transnational concepts of justice implies that economic legitimacy issues addressed 
by broad approaches to legitimacy are seen as particularly important aspects that 
cannot be separated from the political aspects of legitimacy. 
Definitions of the sanctity of agreements ensure that treaties and other statements 
that clarify the rights and obligations of states form the basis for international 
institutional arrangements. International institutions for policy coordination on 
security issues are helpful to ensure peace and stability. Common organisations are 
necessary to carry out security management. They can be informal, such as the ad 
hoc conferences used during the nineteenth century European Concert.10 Common 
organisations could also be formal, such as the series of arms control negotiations 
that took place between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. 
The decision of states to remain within rule-bound limits is not a question of law but 
of politics, and contemporary political agreements are often negotiated in the context 
of informal and formal organisations.11 
Accordingly, Chinese contributions to regional order in East Africa, which 
provide peace and security, require policies on the use of force, legitimacy and 
institutional arrangements that are compatible in the sense of facilitating security 
management among regional states and international actors. The English School 
examines the question whether states provide platforms for policy coordination 
that address key security issues, keeping a lid on potential conflicts, and facilitating 
cooperation.12 This makes the school useful for investigating the question whether 
China builds strategic partnerships in East Africa that do not merely benefit Chinese 
national interests, but also facilitate regional peace and security. In the following 
sections, I examine China’s approach to East African order and the extent to which 
this order is implemented by means of Chinese peacekeeping efforts, by economic 
development efforts, and by using diplomatic institutions as an instrument of peace 
and security. 
China’s approach to East African order: OBOR and the UN combined
China’s OBOR initiative is effectively a grand plan to link 4,4 billion people and 
more than 60 countries stretching from Beijing to Europe, through Central Asia, the 
Middle East and Africa, in a modern version of the land and maritime Silk Roads. 
The initiative is to put China at the centre of a global network of interconnections.13 
OBOR is based on Chinese standards of governance that are negotiated as the project 
unfolds and in cooperation with the partner countries. 
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 46, Nr 2, 2018. doi: 10.5787/46-2-1190
80
OBOR is one of the major initiatives of China’s Xi Jinping administration.14 The 
main objective of OBOR is to establish an alternative to the liberal free trade projects 
of Western states and institutions, or in the least, to conform to neoliberalism with 
‘Chinese characteristics’.15 This alternative includes technology sharing, frequent 
demands for compulsory partnerships between foreign and domestic actors, strong 
state-owned companies, and tight capital control. Additional objectives encompass 
the expansion of China’s overseas markets and increasing Chinese sources of energy 
supplies. Moreover, an important objective entails promoting financial stability by 
establishing principles of conduct at a time when China is increasingly exposed to 
financial risk.16 OBOR encompasses private market-driven projects and economic 
development projects. The latter type dominates the East African part of OBOR. The 
objective of stability is key to China’s willingness to allocate resources to projects 
that may not be economically viable. 
OBOR has been criticised for not having a clear set of rules to guide its activities 
and clarify its purpose, objectives and instruments to other states.17 This may be true. 
For example, the absence of clear rules is strategically useful since it allows Beijing 
to adopt flexible approaches depending on local and historical conditions.18 Other 
voices have pointed out that OBOR is a label for ongoing projects rather than an 
attempt to establish grand new projects.19 For example, in East Africa, a number of 
port and rail projects were agreed before the announcement of OBOR, and both pre- 
and post-OBOR projects are established by a mixture of state-owned and private 
companies; however, labelling matters as an ‘OBOR initiative’ creates the sense that 
China is responsible for contributing to economic growth and development. 
The strategy constitutes a political superstructure to China’s global economic 
role. This involves defining the principles of governance to ensure that Beijing’s 
influence contributes to peace and stability and not just to China’s national interests. 
East Africa is the part of the maritime Silk Road where China has the most strategic 
freedom of action. This situation is due to a low level of military-strategic United 
States (US) involvement and long-standing diplomatic and military links between 
China and East Africa.20 
China has hooked up with the UN system in its pursuit of gradual revisions to 
the existing principles concerning global development and security management. 
For example, China acknowledges the UN-based Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 
doctrine on the responsibility to protect populations against atrocity crimes. However, 
China challenges Western efforts to use the doctrine to legalise the right to intervene 
without regime consent. Beijing insists that implementation of R2P begins with the 
responsibility of the state in which atrocity crimes are committed and pursues this 
interpretation when engaged in peace and stability efforts in states such as South 
Sudan.21 This way of going about exercising influence has several advantages. If 
China embedded its overseas activities in Sino-centric concepts of world order, 
Beijing would meet immediate resistance to policies and principles of conduct 
that have no a priori legitimacy with other states. By contrast, the UN system has 
universal legitimacy, so China only has to persuade the international community that 
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 46, Nr 2, 2018. doi: 10.5787/46-2-1190
81
its interpretation of right and wrong conduct is in compliance with the UN Charter. 
On this basis, China has successfully defended the status of absolute sovereignty 
and introduced its own policy on how to pursue development and security overseas. 
Constraints on the use of force: Peacekeeping efforts
China’s approach is to use the continent-wide forum of the AU as a platform 
for Africa-wide policy coordination and to facilitate East African bilateral and 
multilateral intergovernmental projects. The intention is to reconcile human justice 
and sovereignty by allowing neighbouring states significant influence on how to 
create security in their local environment. Apart from the deployment of UN 
troops, China also contributes military and financial assistance to AU peacekeeping 
endorsed by the UN. In 2015, at the Forum for China–Africa Cooperation, China 
earmarked US$100 million for the AU’s standby force and the African Capacity for 
Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC). China has also promised to send its first 
helicopter squad to UN peacekeeping operations in Africa and set up a permanent 
peacekeeping police squad.22 In June 2017, China’s helicopter squad joined the 
United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).23 By September 2017, 
all of the 300 members of China’s standby police force of UN peacekeeping missions 
had been incorporated into the UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System.24 
Moreover, China donated US$1,2 billion to improve the welfare for the staff of the 
AU’s mission in Somalia, AMISOM.25 These initiatives allow China to participate 
constructively in resolving hot-button issues in Africa the Chinese way by providing 
economic assistance for greater regional self-reliance. 
China emphasises the importance of the UN in efforts to safeguard African 
peace and stability.26 China’s approach to regional order is to use the continent-wide 
forum of the AU as a flexible platform for policy coordination with Africa as a whole 
to facilitate bilateral agreements outside of the AU framework. Even when China 
deployed a permanent mission to the AU in 2015, China mainly consulted with 
African ambassadors of individual countries, suggesting that the AU does not have 
a coherent China policy.27 Consequently, most of China’s East African projects are 
bilateral intergovernmental or private sector projects.28 
However, while bolstering China’s image as a responsible great power, such 
involvement and support of regional security architecture also bears the risk of 
creating a situation in which China will be confronted with its reluctance to support 
interference in other states’ sovereign sphere. This could have been the case with 
Burundi in 2016 if the collective AU had supported an intervention without the 
consent of Burundi’s government, placing China in a difficult dilemma. 
China has around 2 600 peacekeepers stationed in UN missions, mostly in 
Africa. The largest deployment, more than 1 000, serves in South Sudan. Submission 
of UN peacekeeping personnel to UN authority is important to China to demonstrate 
that it acts as part of the efforts by the international community to promote peace and 
security. UN authority is not based on a leadership approach involving a hierarchy 
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of intervening powers and one state submitting decision-making authority to another 
state. Instead, UN efforts are based on the legal equality of states and the authority 
of the UN Security Council in which China has veto powers. Therefore, China’s 
recognition of UN authority does not violate its commitment to non-interference. 
One element in China’s OBOR strategy is to build infrastructure facilitating 
intra- and inter-regional economic interaction and peacekeeping initiatives. Djibouti 
forms a central part of the maritime Silk Road. It has Chinese-built port facilities 
for commercial and military use. In 2016, Chinese naval and military contingents 
arrived in Djibouti. China has built its first permanent naval base at the site of the 
US-built naval pier in the port of Obock.29 China has announced that it plans to build 
additional port facilities. In East Africa, Beijing has approached the Seychelles as a 
likely partner. Chinese escort ships already halt for supply and rest facilities in the 
ports of the Seychelles.30 Permanent overseas naval facilities serve various purposes. 
In their capacity as military bases, port facilities could help China realise plans to 
enable its navy to focus on a combination of offshore waters (‘green water’) defence 
and open seas (‘blue water’) protection, requiring global port facilities.31 
However, the facilities are also intended as staging points for operations that are 
overall positive for maritime public goods provided for societal rather than individual 
consumption, such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. This indicates the 
greater weight placed on acting as a responsible great power emphasising both order 
and justice. One purpose is to use the facilities as a logistics hub for naval operations 
to support Chinese anti-piracy operations. Such operations encompass participation 
by the People’s Liberation Army Navy in multination anti-piracy efforts in the 
Gulf of Aden since 2008. This function is likely to facilitate increasing cooperation 
between the countries participating in anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden, the 
Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean to ensure the safe passage of civilian vessels.32 
China’s policy is to adopt only defensive measures and to support African 
government institutions irrespective of ideological or religious preferences.33 The 
intention is to strengthen the regime’s effective control of its sovereign territory and 
citizenry, emphasising the element of order. In China’s view, giving preference to 
state rights rather than individual rights is likely to minimise violence in the long run, 
because it keeps a lid on intra-ethnic and intra-religious conflicts.34 Following the 
2005 peace agreement between northern and southern Sudan, China has contributed 
peacekeeping personnel to the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). From 2006, China 
deployed peacekeeping personnel with tasks such as engineering, transportation and 
medical assignments.35 In 2015, China deployed combat troops for the first time to 
a UN peacekeeping mission by contributing 700 troops to the UN peacekeeping 
mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).36 China still has far less of a military presence 
than other major powers, such as the US and France, who both have their own 
military bases in Djibouti. The Chinese troops are not designated as combat forces 
employing the full range of military instruments. The troops are armed as defensive 
security forces only.37 This means that the Chinese forces are used only for defensive 
purposes such as the protection of civilians and government buildings and not for 
offensive purposes.38 
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 46, Nr 2, 2018. doi: 10.5787/46-2-1190
83
China also supports local military forces, enabling them to protect national 
sovereignty. For example, in 2015 China donated US$1 million for the construction 
of armouries for the Somali National Army.39 Beijing’s contributions to strengthen 
weak national militaries in East Africa are accused of increasing violence and 
unrest on the grounds that China’s assistance is targeting government forces. This 
is Beijing’s policy even if the recipient states are placed in the lowest category of 
the Freedom House index of fragility, political oppression and authoritarian political 
systems, such as Somalia and Sudan.40 For example, the sale in 2014 by China 
North Industries Corporation (Norinco) of US$20 million worth of arms and arms-
related material to the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), the South Sudanese 
government’s armed forces, has engendered criticism for contributing to intrastate 
violence. However, there is no arms embargo in place on South Sudan, and other 
countries such as Israel are also arms exporters to South Sudan.41 Nevertheless, China 
halted weapon sales in 2014 in response to the international criticism that China’s 
arms sales undermined the peace process, highlighting the dilemmas between order 
and justice facing Beijing.42
Legitimacy and China’s economic development efforts
One element of China’s OBOR initiative is to undertake economic development 
projects that link economies together by infrastructure and communication without 
political conditionality. China argues that this strategy helps put developing countries 
on a viable economic and social footing and facilitates long-term political stability.43 
The strategy is coupled with China’s UN policy of focusing on both pre- and post-
intervention stabilisation measures such as social, economic and reconstruction 
efforts under the auspices of the UN system. China has a substantial and long-
standing presence in East Africa. Beijing argues that this long-standing engagement 
gives it detailed economic, social and political knowledge that makes development 
assistance effective. Africa has become China’s second largest supplier of crude oil. 
The top African suppliers are Angola and Sudan.44 Sudan is also among China’s top 
five African trade partners. When South Sudan, host of a large number of Chinese 
oil investments, seceded from Sudan with UN approval in 2011, China also extended 
development projects and loans to this new state.45 
South Sudan is a welcome opportunity for China to implement its development 
policy in an area with relatively limited engagement from other states. China is 
willing to accept conditions, such as a very low per-barrel oil fee without the promise 
of rights to future reserves. This is possible when Chinese state-owned companies 
are involved because they do not answer to shareholders. A caveat to China’s ability 
to influence conditions in this country is the comparative lack of popularity of 
China amongst the South Sudanese public compared to China’s standing in other 
African countries.46 One reason for China’s bad reputation is Beijing’s role as a 
significant arms supplier to the Sudanese government in Khartoum when the civil 
war was ongoing prior to South Sudan’s secession in 2011. However, the political 
establishment in Juba recognises the importance of cooperating with China.47 The 
pragmatic attitude among South Sudanese leaders combined with China’s preference 
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for a top-down approach to its overseas development and security engagements 
implies that popular discontent with Chinese influence has limited influence on 
Beijing’s ability to implement its policies in South Sudan. 
In regional states, such as Ethiopia, China has developed special trade 
and economic cooperation zones, which allow for the improvement of poor 
infrastructure, inadequate services, and weak institutions by focusing efforts on a 
specific geographical area.48 A special economic zone is a geographically demarcated 
area within a country, which functions with different administrative, regulatory and 
fiscal regimes compared to the rest of the country. The different rules applied in 
these zones usually concern investment conditions, taxation and international 
trade regulations. Usually, the rules aim to ensure that the business environment in 
demarcated zones is more liberal from a policy perspective, and that rules applied 
are more efficient from an administrative perspective than those prevailing in the rest 
of the domestic economy. As of 2014, China had established 19 special economic 
zones overseas. Of these, six are located in Africa: one in Zambia, one in Mauritius, 
two in Nigeria, one in Egypt, and one in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa hosts the only 
overseas zone in East Africa.49 China established the first private industrial zone in 
Ethiopia with the development since 2007 of the privately owned Eastern Industrial 
Zone (EIZ). Chinese partners in Ethiopia’s special economic zone predominantly 
provide infrastructure financing and foreign direct investments. They also provide 
training and technical support on the development and management of the special 
economic zone. UN-sponsored research has revealed that in Ethiopia, delays in 
infrastructure and utility services development, such as access to electricity and 
water, are among the zone’s main challenges.50 China’s special economic zone has 
contributed to creating permanent local jobs, and working in the zone is considered 
an opportunity to acquire skills and generate income. The roles and responsibilities 
of the Ethiopian government and the Chinese investors are defined in memorandums 
of understanding (MoUs). As a result, both parties contribute to financing projects.51 
The success of China’s special economic zone in Ethiopia can be explained by 
a number of factors. First, special economic zones should fit into and benefit from 
specific local circumstances in line with China’s principle that Africa must follow 
its own development path. Second, continuous government involvement in policy 
formulation and monitoring, and in the provision of infrastructure, is indispensable 
to the successful development of special economic zones. Third, a continuous focus 
on human resource development both in terms of expertise concerning special 
economic zones and in terms of possessing a skilled labour force, seems to have been 
a precondition of success in terms of contributing to economic development. The 
involvement of Ethiopian financial contributions and labour in China’s development 
projects has helped ensure the success of the EIZ.52 
Ethiopia is the second most populous African country after Nigeria. Ethiopia 
is also China’s primary economic and strategic partner in East Africa. China has 
reservations regarding Kenya, the alternative to Ethiopia to receive preferential 
treatment. China’s engagement in Kenya is limited due to concerns about corruption, 
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crime, theft, disorder and safety.53 Ethiopia’s position as China’s primary partner has 
helped Addis Ababa build one of the strongest militaries in Africa, experience the 
fastest economic growth rate in Africa since 2006, and host the AU headquarters. As 
a regional centre for East Africa, Ethiopia aspires to become the regional hegemon. 
However, its regional neighbours do not see Ethiopia in this light because its regional 
policies are characterised by a historically determined bid for hegemony rather than 
by policies and initiatives taking into account East Africa’s common interests.54 As 
China’s strategic partner, Addis Ababa receives significant military and economic 
assistance without political conditionality constraints. Ethiopia maintains Western 
ties, using Chinese assistance as a bargaining chip in negotiations with European 
donors and vice versa.55 
Recognising Ethiopia’s lack of legitimacy as a regional power, China also 
supports other regional countries, as implied by Beijing’s development of deep-water 
ports in Djibouti, Kenya and Tanzania and the construction of a regional rail corridor 
connecting Kenya, one of the African gateways to the maritime Silk Road, with 
Uganda, Burundi and South Sudan.56 Burundi, which is relatively resource-poor, has 
received Chinese financial support of US$800 000 for its 2015 national elections. In 
addition, China has helped fund the construction of a new presidential palace and an 
electric power plant, and gives 97% of Burundi’s exports to China duty-free access.57 
China’s assistance helps maintain a rough balance of power between Ethiopia and 
smaller economies, such as Tanzania, Kenya and Burundi. 
Problems remain that should be addressed in China’s regional trade and 
economic engagement. For example, Chinese firms should make greater effort to 
enhance localisation and offer more job opportunities for local workers. They should 
also work to protect emerging local industries and promote a trade balance between 
China and the region, according to Chinese observers.58 On the other hand, China is 
the only one among major donors that has pushed for industrialisation and related 
infrastructure improvement. As a result, China has produced or financed many of the 
paved roads, railroads and power plants in the region. This has filled a vacuum that 
has helped put in place basic preconditions for economic growth. In addition, the 
introduction of a special economic zone has attracted Chinese companies that have 
settled down, in particular in the industrialised and infrastructure sectors, thereby 
contributing to long-term economic development.59 
Diplomacy as an instrument of peace in a regional and global context
Traditionally, China has distanced itself from involvement in regional political 
and military disputes. Departing from this position, China has been actively 
involved in diplomatic efforts to end South Sudan’s civil war by mediating between 
the warring political factions.60 Responding to threats of United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) sanctions, in August 2015, South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir 
Mayardit and opposition fighters led by Riek Machar signed a peace deal, which 
made Machar vice-president. In April 2016, China donated US$550 000 and office 
equipment to the UN-endorsed ceasefire monitoring body of South Sudan’s newly 
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formed unity government.61 In 2016, the peace agreement fell apart with the ouster 
of Vice-President Machar and the consolidation of the political and military power 
of President Salva Kiir Mayardit. It remains to be seen whether the peace process 
can be put back on track by a revised agreement between the contending political 
factions.62 
A lack of other major powers willing to intervene combined with significant 
Chinese energy interests in South Sudan encouraged China to contribute to brokering 
peace. Beijing wanted to demonstrate that it is not merely protecting its national 
interests in South Sudan, but also takes seriously its commitment to be a responsible 
power obliged to promote peace and security and protect civilians against mass 
atrocities within the UN framework.63 China recognised the new regime in South 
Sudan when it obtained independence in 2011. Beijing took this decision because 
the new country emerged on the basis of a negotiated and voluntary decision assisted 
by the international community in the form of UN approval. The new political 
reality was not forced upon Sudan. Beijing does not oppose voluntary regime 
change.64 Moreover, UNSC resolution 1996 specifically mentions that UNMISS was 
established on the basis of consent from the target state.65 Consequently, Chinese 
participation in UN initiatives in South Sudan does not violate Beijing’s commitment 
to non-interference in principle. However, in practice, China’s diplomatic ties with 
Juba following the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement’s establishment of 
two governing entities in Khartoum and Juba, respectively, represented a creative 
interpretation of non-interference, even if the principle was not breached. This 
development begs the question of how protection of China’s investments can be 
reconciled with its policy of non-interference.66 
The continued importance for China of non-interference and of regional 
positions on the legitimacy of this principle in the event of atrocities against 
civilians was demonstrated by Beijing’s position on suggestions for deploying 
African peacekeepers in Burundi in 2015-16. Beijing supported the Burundian 
government’s rejection of AU plans to deploy 5 000 East African Standby Force 
(EASF) peacekeepers to protect civilians. The EASF mission was to ensure that 
the region has indigenous professional military forces to be deployed in regional 
hot spots. Institutionally, the EASF is a peacekeeping force under the AU, which 
has yet to be endorsed by the UNSC as deployable. Due to Burundian President 
Nkurunziza’s objections, any deployment would require UNSC approval. Russia 
and China signalled that they would block any resolution infringing upon Burundi’s 
sovereignty. Moreover, key EASF countries Rwanda and Tanzania announced that 
they would not contribute troops. Hence, China’s position on intervention was in line 
with the attitude of key regional states.67 To support a diplomatic solution, China has 
donated US$200 000 to the East African Community (EAC) as part of efforts aimed 
at facilitating a Tanzania-led dialogue to resolve the political crisis in Burundi.68 
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Conclusion
In this article, I have used the English School as a basis for arguing that Chinese 
contributions to regional order in East Africa comprise:
•	 regulating the use of force in East Africa by means of peacekeeping; 
•	 using economic development as a driver of stability and legitimacy; and 
•	  using diplomatic institutions as instruments of reconciling Beijing’s non-
interference policy with the need for contributing to the management of 
security issues that threaten the common interest in peace and stability. 
The English School has facilitated an analysis of how Beijing seeks to reconcile 
the dilemmas stemming from China’s concern to preserve a state-based regional 
order in a region with growing demands for intervention. These growing demands 
are due to the prevalence of sub-state and transnational security issues in states with 
weak governmental institutions combined with considerable economic and social 
challenges. 
The analysis has highlighted the dilemmas for countries involved in balancing 
order and justice. China experiences the dilemmas in Beijing’s focus on order 
through the support of regime institutions and non-interference. This engenders 
challenges to justice by potentially allowing rogue regimes to jeopardise the basic 
security of individuals. In turn, these rogue regimes potentially challenge regional 
order by the spreading of instability and conflict across borders within the region. An 
example is the humanitarian crisis in South Sudan since 2016. China has focused on 
accommodating the secession of South Sudan from Sudan. This Chinese focus has 
involved contributing to the peace process and to economic development, relying 
heavily on interaction with the Juba government with reference to Beijing’s non-
interference policy. Beijing’s approach diverts attention away from the ongoing 
deadly clashes between government and opposition forces set off by violence and 
displacements. The resulting refugee flows to neighbouring states trigger tensions 
and critical shortfalls in water, food, shelter, health, education and access to arable 
land.69 The inability of the UN to offer protection of civilians against atrocities 
illustrates that China’s much publicised UN peacekeeping contributions do little to 
avert humanitarian crises. 
Despite these reservations concerning China’s contribution to regional order, 
Beijing’s general objectives of promoting regional development and stability remain 
a focal point. China concentrates on facilitating economic growth and state stability 
by including East Africa in a global development and communications network 
based on the principles of non-interference and governmental consent. China’s 
OBOR strategy constitutes a comprehensive approach to East Africa’s development 
and stability. It is a nationally crafted strategy that combines governance, economic 
growth and security sector reform in the target countries with Chinese national 
interests. In addition, Beijing bases its comprehensive approach on East Africa’s 
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historical economic, institutional and political identity in addition to its national 
preferences and interests. The means of implementing the strategy are to build 
physical infrastructure, such as railways and ports, thereby contributing to economic 
growth, and Beijing supports the ability of governments to exercise sovereign 
authority on the basis of its preference for a state-centred approach based on non-
interference. Although this approach does not always prevent humanitarian crises 
or ensure stability, its contributions to economic development and regime stability 
seem to have some positive effects on peace and security in East Africa that may help 
pave the way for future regional order.
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